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CASE LAW UPDATE &
LITIGATION TRENDS

Thomas A. D aily

R ecent Developments in O il and Gas Law - A rkansas and B eyond
B y T homas A. Daily 1
With one exception, the severance tax, it has been a pretty quiet year so far in
Arkansas, though, with the legislature in session, that could change any minute.
Luckily, cases from other states more than fill the void. Here we go!
A rkansas L egislature , in S pecial S ession, Raises Gas S everance Tax
Unless you were comatose you already know about this one. A special
legislative session was convened by the Governor, in the face of a threat from a former
wannabe governor, to finance an initiated act campaign. Its purpose, and result: get
some real tax money out of the only thing keeping Arkansas’ pitiful economy running,
natural gas exploration. At the end, a compromise bill was enacted. By Act No. 4 of
2008, the Arkansas General Assembly increased the rate of Arkansas’ natural gas
severance tax, from 3/10 of 1 cent per MCF to a maximum rate of 5% of the market
value of the gas produced, effective January 1, 2008. The 5% rate does not apply to all
wells, however.
The act creates four categories of wells: High-Cost Gas Wells, New Discovery
Wells, Marginal Wells and just plain wells.2
A “High-Cost Gas Well’’ is a well producing from unconventional formations (i.e.
shale or coal formations), a well producing from deeper than 12,500 feet (subsurface),
a well which produces from “Tight Gas Formations” (to be defined by the Arkansas Oil
and Gas Commission) and a well producing from geopressured brine. Production from
High-Cost Gas Wells will be subject to a rate of 1.5% of market value for the first 36

1Member, Daily & Woods, P.L.L.C., Fort Smith, Arkansas.
2The few which do not fit into another category.

production months. That period can be extended for up to 12 additional months or until
“Payout” (a term undefined in the act) of the well, whichever first occurs.
A “New Discovery Well” is a newly drilled “Conventional” (i.e. not “High-Cost")
well. Production from New Discovery Wells will be taxed at a rate of 1.5% of market
value for the first 24 production months.
A “Marginal Well” is a “High Cost Well” which is incapable of producing more
than 100 Mcf per day or a “Conventional Well” that is incapable of producing more than
250 Mcf per day. Marginal Gas will be taxed at a rate of 1.25% of market value.
The owners of those few wells which do not meet any of the above criteria will
have the privilege of paying 5% of market value. That is really not such tough duty if
you remember that those few wells are, by definition, the very best wells in the state.
U. S. District Court Holds T hat Oil and Gas W ere
“ Minerals ,” Under S trohacker , in W hite County, in 1933
Usery, et al. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, et al.3 is another decision

involving whether oil and gas were considered to be minerals, in legal and commercial
usage, at a given time and place in Arkansas. The importance of the question is that
because of the case of Missouri Pacific Railroad, Thompson, Trustee v. Strohacker,4 its
answer is determinative of whether those substances were successfully conveyed in a
deed or reservation of “minerals” without specifying which minerals.
The reservation in question was in a 1933 conveyance out of the Missouri Pacific

3USDC Case No. 4:07CV01185-WRW (ED. Ark. 2008).
4228 Ark. 632, 152 S.W.2d 557 (1941).
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Railroad Company, Anadarko’s predecessor. The question presented is nearly
identical to that answered, for Faulkner County as of 1938, by another judge of the
same court in Webco, Inc., et al. v. Upland Industrial Development Company,5just last
year. Those bookend cases are the easy ones.6 Yet to be decided are other lawsuits
pending in circuit courts in the shale counties with reservation dates closer to the turn of
the former century.
As was observed in this space last year, there has never been an Arkansas
Supreme Court Strohacker decision holding that oil and gas were considered “minerals"
before 1900 nor one holding that oil and gas were not considered “minerals” after that
date. There is no value, in property law, to uncertainty how a court might decide such a
fact intensive issue in every unique setting. The wise words of the late Justice
McFadden, whose two lucid dissenting opinions in Stegall v. Bugh, 228 Ark. 632, 210
S.W. 2d 351 (1958), and Ahne v. The Reinhart and Donovan Co., 240 Ark. 691, 401
S.W. 2d 565 (1966), urged the rest of the court to stop “drifting like a ship without a
rudder” and adopt a statewide date for oil and gas recognition as a rule of property:
In short, I still insist that I was right in my dissent in Stegall v. Bugh, supra.
I probably will not be on this Court when another mineral reservation case
arises; but I predict that at some time the Court must fix a statewide date
when it was generally recognized that oil and gas were minerals. We have
before us in the case at bar as fine a record as will ever be presented on
this question; and I think this is the time when it should be done; and I
would still insist on January 1, 1900, as such date - or, if the "beginning of

5USDC Case No. 4.07-CV-00035 GTE (E.D. Ark. 2007).
6At least one would think so. At latest report the Ursery decision is on its way to
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Duh!
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the century" is considered a more poetic date, then Jan. 1,1901, would
satisfy the situation. (240 Ark. at 701.)
It is respectfully submitted that Justice McFadden was right in 1958, Justice McFadden
was right in 1966, and the spirit of Justice McFadden residing in those of us left having
to figure out who-owns-what are right today. Please, your collective honors, pick one of
his alternative dates, statewide, and drift no more.
A rkansas C ourt of A ppeals G ives L imited Effect to Unprobated W ill
Osborn v. Bryant7 involved Lacy Bryant’s will, which left the property in question

to his widow, Naomi, for life, with remainder to one of his eight surviving children,
Osborn, should she elect to pay the remaining heirs $200 per acre. Otherwise, the
remainder went to Bryant’s descendants, per stirpes. The will was filed, attached to a
petition for distribution of small estate, pursuant to ACA § 28-40-101, as was an
executed and acknowledged Proof of Will. Notice to creditors was published, as well,
but there was never a probate court order admitting the will to probate. After Naomi
died, Osborn executed an "Administrator’s Deed” in favor of herself although, of course,
she held no such court appointment.8
In a challenge from several of the other heirs at law, the trial court refused to
honor the unprobated will. The Court of Appeals reversed, noting an exception in ACA
§ 28-40-104, the statute which generally refuses to recognize an unprobated will, for

7___ Ark A p p ._____, ____ S.W .3d_____ (No. CA-080589, 2009).
8Curiously, the opinion never tells us whether Osborn paid the $200 per acre.
We assume she did so.
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wills attached to ACA § 28-40-101 affidavits.
Divided T exas S upreme Court Denies “ T res-F rac ” L iability
Perhaps 2008's most important judicial development was the Texas Supreme
Court’s long awaited decision in Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. et al. v. Garza Energy Trust, et
al. 9 One of Texas’ esteemed courts of appeals had mostly approved a jury verdict

which included 10 million dollars punitive damages against Coastal for fracing a well in
such a way that fluids and prop material crossed a unit line and enhanced the flow of
gas across that line into Coastal’s well. Since Coastal operated both units the case was
complicated by charges of violation of the covenant against drainage and other
theories. The Texas Supreme Court was bitterly divided on this one. The majority (five
justices) announced out a new Texas rule of law that recovery of gas by fracing is
protected by the Rule of Capture. A concurring justice argued that the Rule-of-Capture
analysis was unnecessary, because, in his view, subsurface fracing was simply not
actionable trespass for public policy reasons. Three justices, including the chief justice,
joined in a dissenting opinion which would have permitted “tres-frac” liability, but
expressed doubt as to punitive damages, given the inference that Coastal had not
acted in bad faith.
A virtual who’s who of Texas oil and gas interests had filed amicus briefs. These
opinions are lengthy, but well worth reading.
O klahoma A ppellate C ourt A ffirms Non -Consenting Owners ’
Right to V ote for O perator Removal- Refuses To P ermit

951 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1258, 268 S.W.3d 1 (2008).
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Contort S uit For C onversion of Royalties Not Paid
In Tarrant v. Capstone Oil & Gas Co.10 the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals
answered two unrelated questions: do non-consenting parties get to vote in an election
to remove a grossly incompetent operator and may royalty owners use the tort theory of
conversion in a suit against the same operator for underpayment of royalties. The
answers are “yes" and "no.”
The court noted the scarcity of legal precedent on the JOA question. Then,
adopting the rationale of a similar Texas Court of Appeals decision,11 the court held that
the non-consenting parties retained enough interest to justify a conclusion that they
could vote in such elections.
Then, in a remarkably lucid observation, the court noted that the right to receive
royalty was a contract right. Thus, breach of contract,12 not the tort theory of
conversion, was the royalty owners’ exclusive remedy.
Both rulings appear to be sound. Neither issue has been litigated in Arkansas.
T exas C ourt of A ppeals A grees T hat Reserve Calculation Data
is T rade S ecret , Protected From Discovery
One of the hardest things for a plaintiff in a case involving alleged loss of
production is to prove damages. Engineering studies designed to calculate, for

102008 Ok. Civ. App 17, 178 P.3d 866 (2007).
11Hill v. Heritage Resources, Inc., 964 S.W.2d 89 (Tex.App. 1997).
12Enhanced by interest, damages for injury or property arising from the violation,
litigation costs and attorneys fees, under a statute (52 O.S. 2001 § 570.14 (A) and (C))
which is similar to ACA § 15-74-604.
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example, what a well would have recovered had it been drilled to protect from drainage
are expensive. Potentially a simple fix, for the plaintiff, is to discover the defendant
producer’s own reserve studies which, if the defendant is a public company, always
exist.
The modern norm, where discovery is concerned, is laze fare. Generally, if they
ask, you have to tell. If you think the information is a trade secret, the publication of
which will damage you, your remedy is a protective order limiting the use of the
information to the litigation itself. The remedy of the protective order is often less than
completely satisfactory. Such orders are near impossible to enforce. Once the
information is out, protecting it can be compared to unringing a bell.
Remember, also, that discovery of the defendant’s work product is not the only
way for the plaintiff to come up with proof of alleged damages, just a really easy way.
No one seriously argues that the fundamental production data used to calculate
recoverable reserves is secret. Indeed, it is publicly available. The issue is simply a
matter of convenience and economy.
Well, ring up one for the defense. In In Re XTO Resources I, LP, etc.13 XTO
managed to successfully prevent discovery of such materials. In Texas, if material
constitutes a “trade secret" the burden shifts to the party seeking discovery to establish
that the information is necessary for a fair adjudication of a claim or defense in the
litigation. Since the raw data was publicly available, that was not the case.

13248 S.W.3d 898 (Tex. App. 2008).
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T exas A ppeals C ourt L imits Definition O f “ C ommencing D rilling O perations”
One of the unwritten rules of the oil and gas business is: Always put off until the
last possible minute anything which will go there. Thus, an inordinate number of
lawsuits involve a determination of what activity, on or near the last day of a lease term,
will qualify as “commencing operations," so as to perpetuate the term. In Veritas
Energy, LLC v. Brayton Operationg Corp, et al.14 the Corpus Christi-Edinburg division

of the Texas Court of Appeals decided that Veritas’ activities in dragging the grass with
a backhoe to mark the location of a road does not qualify. Thus, the lease expired.
After that, Veritas drilled the lessors a free well.
T exas C ourt of A ppeals Reminds Us T hat

You Can O nly S hut-In a Commercial W ell
AFE Oil and Gas, L.L.C. operated a well in the Barnett Shale play which ceased
to produce in paying quantities. Apparently, commercial production could have been
restored had AFE re-fraced the well. For some reason, it chose not to do so. Rather,
AFE acid perforated the well, called it a shut-in gas well and tendered shut-in royalties,
which the lessors refused. Litigation followed, resulting in a jury determination that the
well was still incapable of commercial production. Therefore, as a matter of law, the
shut-in royalty clause could not be employed to perpetuate the leases. The Texas
Court of Appeals, Fort Worth District affirmed in AFE Oil and Gas, L.L.C., et al. v.
Armentrout, et al.15 What is so hard to understand here? You can only shut-in a well

14 _S.W .3d____ (Tex. App. 2008).
15 __ S.W .3d_____ (Tex. App. 2008).
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which can, right then and there, produce in commercial quantities. Dead wells and
broken wells are not candidates.
T exas Court of A ppeals Holds T hat C ontract Condition ,
“ A pproval of T itle ,” is S ubjective, not O bjective
Approval of title is a common condition of an offer to purchase an oil and gas
lease or other mineral interest. Therein lies a question. Is “approval” measured
subjectively (the purchaser can disapprove for any reason or, for that matter, no good
reason) or objectively (the purchaser can only disapprove if there is a title defect which
others would recognize)? In Massey v. Southwest Petroleum Company16 the Dallas
District of the Texas Court of Appeals appeared to accept the subjective standard.
Massey’s interest was subject to unrecorded agreements, but the evidence was that
they would not have interfered with Southwest’s ownership interests. Nevertheless,
Southwest was not required to perform because it unilaterally decided it did not like the
title.
A nother Texas C ourt O f A ppeals Explains “ W ellbore ” Rights
One of the mistakes that those of us who have worked in the oil and gas industry
for most of our adult lives make is to assume that everyone understands the language
of the industry the same way. Trial lawyers like it that way.17 The facts of Petro Pro

16____ S.W.3 d _____(Tex. App. 2008).
I7lf everyone understood their contracts the same way, there would not be much
to lawyer about.
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Ltd, et at. v. Upland Resources, et al18 d e scrib e a pretty co m m o n tra n sa ctio n . T he
w o rkin g in te re st ow ners w ith in a unit co ntainin g the King “ F” No. 2 W e il,19 and o th e r
w ells, d e c id e d they no lo nger w a n te d the King “ F” No. 2 and se n t it to auction. The
re su ltin g a ss ig n m e n t to th e high bidder, P etro P ro ’s p rede cessor, a ssigned all o f the
a s s ig n o rs ’ rights “in so fa r and o nly in sofa r as said le ases co ve r rights in th e w e llbore of
th e King “ F” No. 2 W e ll." N ow w h a t does th a t m ean?
In litigation, the assig n o rs co ntend ed th a t P etro Pro had th e right to produce the
existin g p e rfo ra te d fo rm a tio n w ith in the w e llbore, the C leveland Z one, and nothing else.
P e tro Pro, on the o th e r hand, co n te n d e d th a t it could p ro d u ce an yth in g w h ich could be
re a ch e d fro m th e w e llb o re and th a t its rights in clud ed th e pow er to d e e p e n the w e llb o re
or even to drill out one or m ore h o rizo ntal e xte n sio n s therefrom .
T h e T e xa s C ourt o f A p p e a ls, A m arillo, held th a t ne ith e r w a s correct. P etro Pro
can p ro d u c e all the gas, fro m w h a te v e r zone s it chooses, th a t th e w e llb o re can produ ce
w ith o u t e xte n d in g the w e llb o re ve rtica lly or horizo ntally, b u t had no right to extend the
w e llb o re .

T exas C ourt O f A ppeals R efuses to Give L iberal Construction to Pugh C lause
El Paso Production Oil & Gas, et al. v. Texas State Bank, et al.20 in volve s a Pugh
cla u se in id entical leases ‘‘[T]his lease shall te rm in a te ...if Lesse e fa ils to c o n tin u e to

18_____ S .W .3 d ______(Tex. A pp. 2007).
19A bit o f a dog, p ro d u cin g m a rg in a lly fro m so m e th in g called the C leveland
F o rm a tio n .
20_____ S .W .3 d ______ (Tex. A pp. 2007).
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develop...except as to lands covered by this lease which are...included within a pooled
unit." The problem came when El Paso formed units which were depth limited. The
lessors contended that those facts caused the Pugh language to operate vertically as
well as horizontally. The Texas Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that "lands” meant
“lands.”
C olorado Court of A ppeals R efuses Novel Use of Private Condemnation Right
Akin and Stepe own Colorado property upon which a gas well is located.
Apparently the production from the well is not unitized. The nearest interstate pipeline
is a little over three miles away from Akin and Stepe’s property. They sought to
condemn a private right-of-way across neighboring tracts in order to lay a pipeline
connecting the well to market. Colorado, like Arkansas, has a statutory condemnation
procedure enabling a landlocked owner to have ingress and egress to his property by
condemning a “way of necessity."
In Akin and Stepe v. Four Corners Encampment, et a/.21 the Colorado Court of
Appeals squashed that idea. Private “ways of necessity” are passages for transporting
humans, not gas.
K entucky Court of A ppeals Holds T hat “ Drilling O perations”
Do Not Include Restoring P roduction in Existing W ell
Heer obtained a lease from the Fraser Sisters which included the condition that
“[i]f no well be commenced...this lease shall terminate as to both parties.” Heer then

21____ P.3d_____ (Colo. App. 2007)
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reestablished production22 from an existing well on the lease premises, but drilled no
new well during the primary term. In Heer v. Fraser, et a l 23 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals affirmed a lower court ruling that Heer’s activities did not satisfy the drilling
obligation of the lease and kicked him out.
L ock Up A nything of V alue , T he L egislative Follies are Back in Town
Did I mention that 2009 is an odd numbered year? That said, citizen legislators,
familiarly clad in Big Smiths and snake skin boots, are roaming beneath that big pretty
dome overlooking downtown Little Rock. As we write, it is too early to have much to
say except “WATCH OUT." More will be known when we see one another in Hot
Springs.

22Apparently commercial, but barely so.
23____ S.W.3 d _____ (Ky. App. 2008).
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